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The concept of civilizations plays an important role in the current scientific li-
terature. Some authors select a particular number of civilizations. For other aut-
hors it is an open question how many civilizations exist: the answer depends on 
the criteria applied. The paper discusses the concept of the borderland civiliza-
tion that relates to the countries (space) and people (cultural communities living 
in this space), situated “between” the two “key cultural groupings” (in Samuel 
Huntington’s sense) and inevitably combines some features from both of them. 
The author argues that, firstly, the population on today’s Polish-Lithuanian-
Belarusian border constitutes a particular borderland civilization where the lo-
cal identity dominates over national or ethnic identities. Although other iden-
tities might be in use here, the population of this borderland region primarily 
considers itself as “local” where multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and multi-religious 
communities have existed for centuries. 
Secondly, the current Belarus itself can be viewed as a case of a borderland sub-
civilization: throughout its history it has been constantly influenced by Latin 
(Western) and Byzantine (Eastern) civilizations that resulted in Belarusian cul-
tural pluralism, high level of religious and ethnic tolerance, and local self-iden-
tification of the population. Therefore, there is no “choice” for Belarus to belong 
to one “pure” civilization: it is destined to exist in the borderland. From this 
approach, current Belarus is not “civilization outskirts”: it is a sub-civilization
with all the attributes such as culture, values, ideas of history, and supra-nation-
al socio-cultural community of people.




The goal of this paper is to analyze the concept of the borderland civilization as a 
special type of a cultural community living in a territorial space and united by com-
mon cultural values, common myths of their history and meanings of life (Липкин 
2008: 113). This view on civilization differs from Huntington’s view, according to 
which civilization is “the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of 
cultural identity”, where the cultural lines strongly divide the eight major civilizations 
(Хантингтон 1994: 34). Polish-Lithuanian-Belarusian borderland civilization locates 
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“in between” the Latin (Catholic) and Eastern (Orthodox) civilizations and combines 
some of their features in a tolerant way. From the perspective of Huntington’s concept, 
a borderland civilization contains some contradictory features: several languages, cul-
tures and religions. However, in the case of the discussed concept of a borderland civi-
lization, these values do not confront each other; cultural pluralism prevails among 
the people who populate the territory of a borderland. 
There are many borderland civilizations in the world that have emerged on the 
edge of the “key civilizations” that encounter each other in the same space. Thus, a 
borderland civilization can emerge as a result of an assimilation of some features of 
the dominant “foreign” culture by the “local” culture (the case of Northern American 
culture, influencing Mexican culture and resulting in a new borderland civilization 
in Latin America). In many other cases it is a voluntary acceptance of some features 
from both sides of those ethnic communities (or other big social-cultural groups) liv-
ing on the “frontiers” of two bigger civilizations, that are destined to act under some 
historical conditions (this is the case of Polish-Lithuanian-Belarusian civilization). 
The formation of such “borderland cultural localities” can take place through several 
forced processes of assimilation of foreign culture (primarily, its religion) under the 
pressure of military actions, wars, historical events (influence of the Ottoman Empire 
on the Balkans), etc. Historically speaking, these forms can differ, but – under the cur-
rent conditions of globalization – all forms of the construction of borderland cultures 
take place as a complexity (Ганчев 2007: 5). In most cases, the territorial borders of 
contemporary states do not coincide with the borders of their civilizations (Кузьмин 
2008); therefore the population identifies itself as a cultural community (versus na-
tional or ethnic) and share some common vital values and meanings.
I would like to discuss to what extent the current Belarus can be viewed as a bor-
derland civilization, and whether this concept can be applicable to Belarus throughout 
its long history or only for a particular period of time. 
The major object of research is Belarus as a model of the borderland civilization 
and, at the same time, a part of a broader Eastern European borderland civilization: 
Polish-Lithuanian-Belarusian one. From this point of view we can name the former a 
sub-civilization and the latter – civilization; however, this difference is quantitative 
rather than qualitative, in Arkady Lipkin’s terms (Липкин 2008: 113). We assume that 
this concept can be a potentially useful theoretical frame for a better understanding of 
contradictory nature of current Belarusian culture and Belarusian nation. It does not 
mean that other approaches and concepts are not applicable to Belarus: if they provide 
a better knowledge of social, cultural and political development of Belarus, they are 
legitimate as well.
Our approach is not directly related to the sociology of borderland and/or limol-
ogy developed by some Belarusian and Polish scholars (e.g. Andrzej Sadowski 1995, 
Tadeusz Popławski 1996; Mikalai Biaspamiatnych (Беспамятных 2008)); rather, it 
belongs to the inter-disciplinary field related to social theory, social geography, re-
gional and cultural studies. This approach takes into account civilization borders, but 
not in Huntington’s meaning of this concept (Хантингтон 1994); within our approach 
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a borderland civilization unites some “local” ethnicities and smaller cultural commu-
nities (Barth 1996); it does not relate to the state borders (Wilson, Donnan 1998); 
however, it allows to discuss ethno-social, ethno-cultural and nation demarcation lines 
within the “new frontiers” (Kowalska 2007), as well as “feeling of distance” within a 
particular social space (Бурдье 2005).
The two methods mainly used in this paper are: (1) cultural historical analysis: to 
describe the history of Belarus that was always full of contradictions and turns “from 
East to West” and vice versa; these shifts and different influences contributed to the 
construction of the borderland socio-cultural nature of Belarus, and (2) sociological 
survey: the survey data illustrate some theoretical statements and ideas (the author 
took the available representative data collected by other scholars; this is a secondary 
source of information; however, as the selected surveys are representative and trust-
ful, we believe, that these empirical data will be substantially supportive for our theo-
retical analysis making it functional).
The critical approach to the concepts of Belarusian nation constructed by the cur-
rent Belarusian ideologists is used. I will follow the concept partly elaborated by those 
Belarusian scholars, especially Adam Maldis who argues that Belarusians constitute a 
borderland nation conceived as a cultural and/or civil community. 
The analysis of a specific nature of Belarusians has been done by many authors that 
represent the official social science and political practice in Belarus (Eugeny Babosov, 
Olga Abramova, Vsevolod Yantchevski), the pollsters (Andrey Vardamatsky, Oleg 
Manaev), the nationalist “counter-elite” (Vital Silitski, Stanislav Shushkievich) and 
the nationalist-oriented scholars (Valyantsin Akudovich, Igar Babkou, Irina Bugrova). 
Overall, the paper follows the concept of Belarus as a borderland civilization part-
ly supported by Polish sociologist Włodzimierz Pawluczuk (Pawluczuk 2007) and 
Belarusian philosopher Valery Yevarouski (2007), and the concept of Belarusian civi-
lization developed by Maldis (Мальдис 2006; Мальдзіс 2003). 
The paper combines the theoretical frame to analyze the sociological data with the 
critical approach to the concepts of Belarusian nation-state and Belarusian identity 
that dominates among the current nationalist “counter-elite”. 
The concept of a borderland civilization
According to the common scientific view, civilizations are among the major histori-
cal actors that currently are more important than nation-states. They are born, de-
velop, fight each other and die. This idea was clearly elaborated by many authors, 
among them Oswald Spengler, Arnold Toynbee, Huntington. If we take for granted 
the statement that all civilizations differ greatly by their history, languages, culture, 
traditions and, especially, religion, then we have to accept the inevitable “clash of 
civilizations” (Хантингтон 1994: 35). From Huntington’s point of view, religion is 
the most important distinguishing characteristics of particular civilizations. Hunting-
ton distinguished Western European (Catholic or Protestant) and Eastern European 
(Orthodox-Slavic) civilizations that differ in other aspects as well. Huntington’s con-
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cept is the last macro-social concept of the universalistic kind. However, other than 
cultural approaches to the classification of civilizations exist as well. For example, 
in the 20th century the global world was politically divided into the so-called “three 
worlds” – first (capitalist), second (socialist) and third (developing). To some extent, 
we may consider these worlds as types of civilizations. Some Russian authors used 
this term when they contrasted the so-called “soviet” (or “socialist”) and the capitalist 
(Western) civilizations (Шахназаров 1998). In order to show the differences between 
these two civilizations and reflect their complexity, the whole set of criteria was used, 
including the political one. 
For the purpose of this paper we use Huntington’s cultural approach as a starting 
point for the further analysis, taking into account that his definition of a civilization 
(as a “highest cultural grouping of people”) is more a metaphor than a strong so-
cial concept. However, Huntington’s approach allows us to view the European Union 
(EU) as a kind of civilization community of people contrasting, for example, with the 
American civilization (Липкин 2004: 310). The last enlargement of the EU that con-
verted several post-communist Orthodox countries to the EU members, as well as the 
inclusion of some relatively poor states that fitted only the political criteria of the EU 
(such as Romania), have reshaped the previous concepts and views on the “core civili-
zations”. Indeed, if we take for granted that a special European civilization that unites 
the EU members exists, then immediately a question arises whether Slavic-Orthodox 
countries (Bulgaria and Romania) are effectively a part of this civilization or not. If 
there are two different civilizations represented in contemporary Europe, Western and 
Orthodox-Slavic, we have to agree that both civilizations are represented in the EU 
(and therefore that Orthodox countries can fit the EU criteria as well as Catholic or 
Protestant countries). This fact (acceptance of some Orthodox countries to the west-
ern club called the “EU”) contradicts the Huntington’s statement about religion as a 
major cultural criterion of civilization (Хантингтон 1994: 34). 
Additionally, another question arises: is the European civilization equal to the 
EU? Some politicians (including those in Belarus) say that the concept of “Europe” 
is not geographical, it is a political construction, so the USA and Australia can also 
be viewed as parts of the European civilization because they accept the so called 
“European values” (Беларусь ... 2007). From this view, as long as Belarus and 
Ukraine are not the EU members, they are not a part of Europe. At the same time, 
in case Turkey was accepted to the EU, it would immediately become a part of 
Europe, regardless of the dominant religion and geography (not even to mention the 
economic criteria). 
The false nature of Huntington’s concept of civilization is also backed by the so-
ciological data. According to some research, made by the EU countries on the issue 
of self-identification of the population as “European” (or, precisely, “belonging to the 
EU”), people in both old and new EU member-states gave more or less similar an-
swers. They can feel to be European or reject this identity regardless of a particular 
country of citizenship. In some countries more people accept European identity (like 
in Italy), while in other countries more people identify themselves via their national 
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identity (like in France). This EU research showed that the more educated and mobile 
a person is, the more positive she/he is about European identity in both old and new 
member-states (National and European Identities Are Compatible 2004). Hence, even 
the new member-states can fit the criteria of European identity, and vice versa: the old 
European countries can not satisfy them.
The European identity is one of the core European values that also include liberty, 
human rights, solidarity, social justice, civil society and personal responsibility (Grant 
2007: 1). It is absolutely clear that not only EU countries can share these values. As 
journalist Charles Grant explained, some EU countries are stronger supporters of 
these values, while some other countries are not. Additionally, some non-EU countries 
can stick to the same values – at least in part. Actually, certain European values (such 
as ecological balance or gender equality) can be practically implemented only if the 
whole global community would support them. Methodologically, the European values 
are ideal models to follow. Practically speaking, even within the EU some countries 
are far ahead than others in the implementation of these values. If we apply this con-
clusion to our topic, it will mean that the European civilization as a new cultural com-
munity is in the state of construction and reconstruction. Current Europe is a building 
site for the future Europe that can be safer and socially more responsible than now. 
That is why the exclusion of some countries from the process of European building 
is not productive: it goes against the very spirit of European values. The whole idea 
of “Europe as a common home” is not bound up with the EU and therefore with any 
particular civilization: it presumes that all the countries in Europe and even beyond its 
geographical borders would feel inner solidarity to each other and mutual responsibil-
ity for sustainable development and stability in the world, and act accordingly.
If we take the concept of European civilization as a metaphor rather than a strong 
scholar definition, then within the European civilization we may distinguish Western-
European and Eastern-European patterns. These two are not based on the religion: 
they combine many criteria, including the development of civil society and democ-
racy, market economy and social responsibility; however, all these criteria can be used 
only within a particular historical context. Thus, the same country may belong to the 
Western-European civilization during a particular historical period of time and to the 
Eastern-European during the other period (like Hungary).
However, there are some countries that are considered as laying “between” these 
two civilizations because they have always partly belonged to both. This is not be-
cause of geography: such situation has been constructed historically. Therefore, from 
our view, not only Belarus but also Lithuania and Poland (at least its eastern territory) 
belong to the Eastern European borderland civilization. What is typical for a border-
land from the cultural approach? 
Firstly, such countries and nations combine several features from both (“opposite”) 
cultures. Thus, Belarus has several religious denominations as its “native”: Orthodox, 
Roman-Catholic and Greek-Catholic (Uniats), to name some. Currently people can 
freely choose their religion (without the state involvement). In the past the local pop-
ulation here also differed in their beliefs, even when the authorities supported one 
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Church and did not support others. As for Lithuania, currently it is mostly a Catholic 
country; however, only two centuries ago Uniats were popular there as well as in 
Belarus, while during the period of Grand Duchy of Lithuania (GDL) more people be-
longed to the Orthodox Church. Secondly, people of the Eastern European borderland 
civilization are generally tolerant to many different religions, cultures and languages. 
According to some estimation, in the period of GDL there were seven functional lan-
guages in this region (among them five were regional), five religious confessions, and 
several ethnic groups whose identities did not coincide with the linguistic and reli-
gious borders being regional by nature (Гісторыя ... 2008: 36–37). The pluralistic so-
cial and cultural environment determined the inter-cultural and inter-ethnic tolerance 
(or conformism) as the necessary condition for a peaceful life in the same geographi-
cal space. These features were typical for the population of GDL – common mother-
land of current Belarusians, Lithuanians, as well as partly Poles and Ukrainians. So, 
thirdly, the common feature of this regional community was cultural pluralism. The 
cultural pluralism derived from the multi-ethnic nature of the GDL population and 
became a feature of this Eastern European borderland civilization. 
Last but not least feature was a prevailing local identity of the population: local 
(“people from here”) identity was common for all people of this region because mul-
ti-ethnic, multi-cultural and multi-religious communities have existed for centuries 
(Гісторыя ... 2008: 81). This type of identity dominates over national or ethnic identi-
ties among the local population until now (Holm-Hansen 2000: 95). Although other 
identities might be in use as well, the population of the borderland region primarily 
considers itself as “local”. According to some data, these features are still real among 
the population of the Polish-Lithuanian-Belarusian borderland – centuries after the 
destruction of GDL! This fact proves that borders of civilization can differ from the 
borders of a state or the territory of a nation, so that nation and civilization can coin-
cide as well as differ from each other.
The current European borderland countries clearly demonstrate that the so-called 
“civilization divisions” are contextual: they have to be explained and understood 
within a particular historical framework. Because the nations of the borderland civili-
zations have some contradictory features derived from their past, the scholars some-
times view such nations as representatives of “civilization outskirts”. This concept 
makes sense: the nations living on the civilization outskirts can be considered as bor-
derland nations of the borderland civilizations. However, the very term “outskirts” is 
ideologically colored: it sounds like “periphery” while in reality the people living in 
the so-called outskirts were not necessary “peripheral people”. They often developed 
their unique culture and languages. We agree that the concept of “periphery” is a con-
struction based on the ideological criteria of values (Popławski 1996: 44). 
That is why the concept of borderland civilization fits the objective analysis more 
than the concept of civilization outskirts: it has no ideological aspect and therefore 
does not exclude some nations/countries. This concept simply means that nations liv-
ing on the borderland territories are not typical in comparison of the “pure patterns” 
of civilizations selected by the Western authors, i.e. the “dominant civilizations” (like 
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Western, Orthodox, or Muslim). For example, Polish nation cannot be considered as 
“typical pattern” of a nation that belongs to the Western civilization even after the 
inclusion of Poland into the EU. The reasons are not economical or political (Poland 
met the threshold criteria). The major reasons are cultural and historical, i.e. con-
textual: they are connected with Polish history. The Polish language contains a lot 
of words that are common with Belarusian and Ukrainian: they are Slavic. Polish 
culture shares similarities with neighbouring cultures, especially folklore. Therefore, 
if civilizations are measured by their culture, Poland has to be measured in the same 
way as Belarus or Lithuania, or Ukraine. People living here have been mixed for 
centuries. Unlike political leaders or regimes, cultures cannot be changed within a 
few years, or even decades. 
Therefore we may assume that Polish civilization also belongs to the Eastern 
European borderland civilization (however, from the other side of this border in 
comparison with Belarus). However, as the concept of borderland civilization is a 
methodological instrument, or an ideal type, current Polish scholars and the Polish 
nation itself has the right to decide whether their country and their nation belongs 
to this particular borderland civilization, or not. This decision is not a totally volun-
tary choice, of course: under certain conditions each borderland nation may decide to 
identify itself as not a borderland, but Western or Eastern – depending on the politi-
cal (and sometimes economical) conditions that would favor such a rational choice 
(that probably happened with current Poland). Anyway, as Ambassador of Poland 
to Belarus Henryk Litwin explained in his interview, “Poles share common history 
and have common cultural roots with Belarusians, as well as with Ukrainians and 
Lithuanians” (Литвин 2008: 8). This statement can be viewed as an acknowledge-
ment that the above-mentioned nations have much in common and – therefore – can 
be viewed (at least in the past) as nations belonging to the Eastern European border-
land civilization.
The acknowledgement of the borderland nature of a country is a political issue 
where political interests play a more important role than culture and history of a na-
tion. Belarus is a good example of such political game. On the one hand, the current 
political regime has some obligations and commitments to Russian political power; 
on the other, for some years it has been politically isolated in Europe and “punished” 
for non-democratic actions (according to the EU criteria). Therefore, to be “pro-Rus-
sian” (or at least to call itself “pro-Russian”) has become politically profitable for 
Belarusian powerful structures, while there were no grounds to identify themselves 
as “pro-Western”. Being politically and especially economically highly dependent on 
Russia, Belarusian system always has to take into account the “rules of the game” 
and follow them having in mind every small change of political environment – re-
gional and global. When the EU expresses a sign of interest to dialogue with the 
Belarusian authorities, this system was also ready to discuss its advantages and dis-
advantages (Оргиш 2008: 3). 
An additional example: since the time of the political changes of “Orange revolu-
tion”, the ruling elite in Ukraine has been showing its closeness to the EU, expressing 
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its interest to join North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and share European 
values. However, for the simple economic and other pragmatic reasons, Ukraine is 
still a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). With one presi-
dent in the office or another, the whole country could not change its nature overnight: 
it is still a Slavic, (mainly) Orthodox and post-Soviet nation. This duality of power 
reflects the borderland position of Ukrainian civilization and its dual interests: it can-
not belong only to the West, as it is also a cultural part of the East.
The nations of a borderland civilization always have to share some important 
common features – historical, cultural, and mental (probably, similarity is not ap-
parent in each case, but countries must demonstrate some similar trends). If we com-
pare Russians (the dominant nation of the Orthodox civilization) with Belarusians 
or Ukrainians, the first noticeable difference is the Russian passionarity (“passion-
arnost”) – a vital energy, an ability to make extra efforts to achieve some goals that 
were important for the process of ethno-genesis. This concept of passionarity was 
developed by Russian scholar Leo Gumilev (Гумилев 1989). Both Belarusians and 
Ukrainians are tied to their lands more than Russians; they are less mobile, and more 
“home-oriented” rather than “going beyond the borders – oriented”. Therefore, as 
some scholars admit, they have not demonstrated passionarity throughout their his-
tory (Ганчев 2007: 10). Probably, Americans are the nation with the highest degree 
of passionarity within the period of modernity: they are always ready to change the 
society, to compete with others and conquer the world far beyond the borders of the 
USA. The core feature of an American nation was explained by a famous political 
scholar Martin Lipset as “an exceptionist nation” (Lipset 1996): Americans always 
feel they are in the centre of the world and have to distribute their own values to the 
rest of the globe. They take it as their “mission”.
In the ancient times Greeks had a passionarity; otherwise, they would have never 
traveled so far and learn the oikumene. They combined enthusiasm with the readi-
ness for a high risk while the typical borderland nations stayed calm and stable try-
ing to adapt to a situation. The latter are more tolerant to other cultures because 
they always live on the edge of cultures and have to adjust themselves to “others”. 
Belarusians demonstrate a model of such tolerance to their neighbours (e.g. Jews, 
Tatars). However, for the same historical reasons, under different circumstances, the 
borderland nations can be more rigorous: this is the case with Catholic Poles and 
Lithuanians (they are more demanding to themselves regarding their religion and tra-
ditions while being less demanding to foreigners and “others” in general).
If we ignore the existence of the borderland civilizations, then we have to place 
all of them into some “pure” civilization frameworks (Western, Muslim etc.). By do-
ing so, scholars would play a role of the famous mythological figure Procrustes who 
placed all individuals on the same bed to measure and – when they did not fit the 
bed – cut them either from one side or another.
The selected approach to a borderland civilization does not coincide with the bor-
derland studies approach, according to which borderland people feel as if they be-
longed to the outskirts and constructed a “conflict zone”. As far as I am concerned, 
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borderland people can live within the same nation-state (not necessarily in two 
countries near their state borders). A borderland civilization differs from a border-
land region as it is described in some borderland studies. Thus, Odilia Martinez 
selected such features of borderland population as their peripheral culture, sense of 
“being different”, and increased level of conflicts. These people allegedly feel dif-
ferently from their fellows living in the centre of the country (Martinez 1994: 304). 
In this research on the U.S.-Mexican border the object was not a “borderland civili-
zation”, but rather a zone “near the border” of two quite different states; a “border-
land region”, but not a “borderland civilization”. Under such context the borderland 
space most probably generates conflicts and makes people feel “being different”. 
However, in the case of a borderland civilization we assume that a whole country 
(or countries) exists on the edge of different “core civilizations” (instead of small 
regions near the state borders). For this reason our approach differs from the border-
land studies as described by Biaspamiatnych (Беспамятных 2008): this scholar also 
discusses regions near the border and not a whole country that itself is a symbolic 
“border of civilizations”.
It would be a topic of additional research to define all characteristics of a bor-
derland civilization. For the purpose of this paper we named its most important 
characteristics. Therefore, on the basis of the analysis of a borderland civilization 
as an ideal type, or methodological instrument, now we can move to Belarus as a 
representative of such civilization. 
Belarus as a borderland civilization
The key elements of a civilization include its culture, history, the spiritual core as 
well as a spatial location that distinguishes one civilization from others (Липкин 
2004). Each civilization has to construct its clear self-identity. In the case of Be-
larusian civilization, it means that the population of Belarus has to distinguish itself 
from other neighbouring civilizations and feel its own specificity – mental, cultural, 
religious or any other. 
In case of analysis of a borderland civilization that coincides with one state we 
use the term “sub-civilization” to show the quantitative differences between a bor-
derland civilization that embraces several countries and nations, on the one hand, 
and its part represented by one country and one nation, on the other. That is why 
we name Belarus a borderland sub-civilization as a part of the Eastern European 
borderland civilization. 
Generally speaking, a civilization corresponds to a cultural community of a 
higher level than a nation united around some core values and goals. Thus, Eastern 
European civilization is connected with a broad community of people that share 
the values of tolerance, plurality and multi-culturalism. Current European civili-
zation relates to the population of the EU countries that generally share values of 
human rights, democracy, legal equality, mutual responsibility and the like. In case 
of Belarusian sub-civilization the situation is a bit different: it corresponds to the 
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Belarusian nation viewed as a civil nation that consists of several cultural groups 
of people regardless of their ethnicity, nationality, native language and religion. We 
can talk about the Belarusian sub-civilization to the same extent as we can talk 
about the civil nature of current citizens of Belarus consolidated into a civil nation. 
Although such a civil nation is currently more a theoretical model than an empirical 
phenomenon, the processes of the development of Belarusian nation and Belarusian 
civilization currently coincide. Therefore, we can talk about Belarusian nation as a 
national community and a cultural or civilization community as well. In what fol-
lows we will discuss the national identity of Belarusians within the social-political 
discourses represented by different Belarusian intellectual elite. 
The national identity is a modern constructed phenomenon; its perception among 
the others depends on the prevailing images. Special efforts are needed to build a 
positive image of a nation and mobilize the masses to accept this image as their own 
self-identity. 
The most important issue is the following: who (which agent) is responsible for 
the construction of such positive image of Belarusian nation? This agent (or so-
cial actor) must construct the image of Belarusian nation that should be useful for 
any national movements (in case of the struggle for national liberation) or consoli-
date and strengthen the nation (in case of its independent development in the global 
world). 
According to the concept of British scholar of nationalism John Breuilly, the 
well-educated national elites (intellectuals) are primarily responsible for the con-
struction of the inspiring ideas that will consolidate the masses (Breuilly 2001: 49). 
In our case, a positive self-image is necessary for Belarusians both to feel as in-
dependent (civil) nation and to feel as a unique Belarusian civilization (i.e. a huge 
cultural community).
The social sciences and Belarusian public represent different approaches to the 
issue of who is playing the role of the major actor responsible for the construction of 
Belarusian identity. Accordingly, different elites interpret the results of the process 
of the nation-construction in a different way. 
First, the nationalist-oriented authors (politicians and scholars) always assume 
that Belarusian national consciousness has been much less developed in compar-
ison to the neighbouring nations (Акудович 1999: 90). Therefore, as a result, as 
Irina Bugrova stated, the process of construction of Belarusian nation is still under 
way (Беларусь ... 2007). These authors describe the process of the construction of 
Belarusian nation primarily in “negative terms” (Silitki’s expression): thus, Bugrova 
described the differences between Belarusians and other nations by simply saying: 
“We do not name ourselves Europeans…” Of course, this answer is acceptable, but 
it is only one aspect of the problem; the second aspect demands positive definitions: 
who are we? What are our positive characteristics? This aspect is almost absent 
from the papers of nationalist-oriented elite. In general, they conclude that there is 
still no Belarusian nation: in the best-case scenario it will be constructed in the fu-
ture; in the worst case – never.
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It seems that the major reason why the nationalist elite does not recognize the ex-
istence of Belarusian nation and does not accept the fact of its construction since – 
at least – the early 20th century (and then its reconstruction in the soviet period – 
late mid-20th century) is the fear to lose some symbolic power over the masses. As 
Silitski clearly writes, “any form of self-definition as the state or nation (or rejection of 
such self-definition) necessarily leads to the redistribution of power, status, and influ-
ence among the political, social and intellectual actors” (Силицкий 2007). Thereafter 
Silitski openly explains, that it is the very particular national group of intellectuals 
that is capable of constructing the attractive image of Belarusian national identity: 
this group can make a civilization self-definition for the country that will be awarded 
with the recognition of “a real national elite” (Силицкий 2007). 
Of course, the nationalist-oriented intellectuals would like to play this role. 
However, under the current political regime they cannot perform it – i.e. they do not 
want to participate in any national construction together with the regime – while 
the latter, as Babosov perfectly expresses, actively tries to build positive images of 
Belarusians and Belarusian nation-state (Беларусь ... 2007). 
If the nationalist-oriented elite recognized the current Belarusian state as a “real 
Belarusian independent nation-state”, then it would have to admit that the role of a 
“real national elite” had been taken by the group of the official ideologists. It is this 
official group of intellectual elite that positively defines Belarusian nation as a “real-
ity”, and not a “dream”. Actually, Silitski worries exactly about this clear conclusion 
when he comments the positive statements about Belarusian nation made by the of-
ficial ideologists (Babosov and Yantchevski). 
The second elite group that is close to the current political system works only in 
the positive. These official elite have constructed an image of Belarusian nation that 
has both “we” – aspect (Slavs, Christians, post-Soviet, Easterners) and “they” – as-
pect (not Westerners, not Americans, and sometimes even not Europeans).
If we compare the role of these two groups of intellectuals (the nationalist-oriented 
and the official, state-oriented), it is necessary to admit that the first group views itself 
only in negative terms: they are “nobody nowhere” (Акудович 1999: 89). On the con-
trary, the group of official ideologists has constructed a positive image of Belarusian 
nation that exists on the real post-Soviet space. Supporters of the latter regard them-
selves as a part of this nation.
It is interesting to add, that the official ideologists are not categorical when defin-
ing the civilization to which Belarus would belong. For example, Babosov admitted, 
that Belarus would join the EU in case other neighbouring post-soviet nations (like 
Russia and Ukraine) would do it first (Беларусь ... 2007). It means that the official 
ideologists agree that current Belarus does not constitute “a part of Russian civiliza-
tion”; on the contrary, they even consider Russia itself as “a borderland” that might 
change its core principles and join the EU: otherwise (if Russia is a “pure civiliza-
tion”) it cannot move quickly from one type of civilization to another type: only the 
borderland civilizations can do that.
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This uncertainty regarding the place of Belarus within the current “borders of 
civilizations” (primarily, the political borders, as we have shown earlier) is not an 
argument to support the statement that Belarus is a “homeless nation” in Europe 
(Екадумов 1998). There is no country with the same “home” forever in its long histo-
ry. Under the extremely complex historical conditions of the last two centuries Belarus 
has changed its “home” several times, but, however, it has kept its major characteris-
tics: mental (good-nature, kindness), behavioral (tolerance, diligence, peacefulness). 
Political regimes also influenced this nature: many authors mentioned conformism of 
Belarusians and their high level of adaptation to any circumstances. These features 
helped people survive in the previous centuries. Probably, they will also help survive 
the hardships under any future political regime on the borderland. 
The above-mentioned features of Belarusian nation are well-known among the 
population; some of them are probably overestimated, but in any case they are the 
part of an image of a Belarusian. They are known from the folklore as well as from 
the public opinion polls in Belarus and Russia. Thus, Russian sociologist Zinaida 
Sikevich analyzes sociological data that describe the modal images of three Slavic na-
tions – Russian, Ukrainians and Belarusians. According to these data (Сикевич 2007: 
26), Belarusians have only positive characteristics in their modal images constructed 
by all three nations. Among their major characteristics she named kindness, open-
ness and tolerance. The other two nations have some negative features – both in their 
evaluations by others and self-evaluations.
From Silitski’s point of view, it does not make sense to pay attention to the polls: 
whatever the masses can say about their self-definition is not true, as “masses are ma-
nipulated” by the regime. To some extent, he is right. However, we cannot ignore pub-
lic opinion polls because democracy also assumes public opinion – if not as a basis of 
decision-making, then at least as an important indicator of mass consciousness. Also, 
we cannot ignore the objectivity of Russian sociological data because there is no need 
for Russian media or Russian political regime to depict Belarusians in a positive way. 
Let us analyze the data of the current Belarusian public opinion polls made by 
independent scholars. We can find the proof that Belarus is “neither East nor West” 
(i.e. the proof of its borderland nature). Thus, according to the data of Independent 
Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Studies (IISEPS) representative national sur-
veys, when being asked whether they would rather join the EU or Russian Federation, 
almost one third of Belarusians expressed the preference to join the EU, and slightly 
less than 50% – Russia (Национальные опросы 2008). Among those who participat-
ed in this survey, only 18% said they are “in opposition” to the current regime; more 
than two thirds of respondents said “no”. It means that at least a part of the popula-
tion that is loyal to the regime also considers Belarus as a potential EU member-state. 
When being asked how they would vote in the referendum regarding the unification 
with Russia, almost equal number of respondents supported unification and rejected it 
(see Table 1).
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Table 1. If today the referendum regarding the unification of Belarus and Russia would take place, 
how would you vote? (per cent)
Answers 06.2008 12.2008
Against the unification 42.2 38.8
For the unification 38.7 35.7
Would not take part in the voting 10.4 14.5
Do not know / No answer 8.7 11.0
These polls’ data clearly prove the “borderland” situation – both in the real politi-
cal space and in the mentality of Belarusians. However, this mixture is not a sign that 
Belarusians are still in the process of formation of their nation consciousness. This is 
a sign that the very national consciousness of this nation, Belarusians, reflects the dual 
conditions of a borderland civilization.
Belarus as a constructed civilization
It is worth discussing the concept of Belarusian civilization developed by Maldis, a 
famous scholar in the field of Belarusian Studies. According to his view, the Belarusian 
civilization has its origins in the 14th century when nations did not exist (Мальдзіс 
2003). It means that Belarusian civilization has always been based on the cultural cri-
teria rather than ethnic or national ones; it was always characterized by religious and 
ethnic plurality and tolerance. Some other Belarusian scholars support this view (Ye-
varouski 2007: 148). 
Belarusian nation as a cultural community with its own “cultural code” was formed 
in the late 19th-early 20th century (Гісторыя ... 2008: 69). The major problem is that 
Belarusian elite did not support this concept and did not distribute it among the masses; 
sometimes the elites even betrayed the nation. That is why regardless of the fact that 
Belarusians have their unique culture, unique language, strong traditions, and a long 
history, according to Maldis, they still have complex of inferiority (Мальдис 2006). 
Maldis worries that, unfortunately, the Belarusian national elite supports this com-
plex instead of helping the masses to overcome it and consider themselves as a nation. 
Maldis recommends Belarusian intellectuals to actively contribute to the process of 
enlightenment of the masses. Thus, he suggests making the names of Belarusian art-
ists, politicians and writers to be well-known as the representatives of Belarusian na-
tion (currently these names are known as Polish, Russian, or American). From Maldis’ 
view, these people should become inseparable parts of Belarusian historical memory: 
any nation needs its own heroes. Unlike passionary nations, which have military com-
manders and kings as their major heroes, most of Belarusian heroes are peace-loving 
civilians: poets, painters, architects and priests. This is an additional criterion to distin-
guish the nature of Belarusian civilization as non-military and non-conflicted one.
Maldis developed a whole program how to find the “lost pages of history” and 
promote them among the masses. When a journalist asked Maldis whether Belarus 
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is a unique civilization, like, for example, Russia, he answered extremely positively. 
For many years Maldis has actively disseminated the achievements of Belarusian cul-
ture and history among the masses – first, in the Soviet Union, then in Belarus and 
the neighbouring countries. Actually, Maldis himself can be viewed as an outstand-
ing proof that Belarusian civilization really exists. However, a theoretical concept of 
Belarusian civilization developed by Maldis (as well as other concepts: Belarusian na-
tion, borderland civilization) must be practically recognized. Before the popular recog-
nition of Belarusian civilization, this concept would exist as an “empty form” related 
to a virtual phenomenon. Until Belarusian nation itself (the majority of the population) 
recognizes the reality of Belarusian civilization as a special cultural community of 
pluralistic groups, the concept of Belarusian civilization would remain only a topic of 
elite’s scientific discussion. As long as Belarusians are not proud of being a borderland 
civilization with a long history, nobody in the world would help them to respect their 
history, culture and themselves. Currently, the historical memory of Belarusians does 
not keep many achievements and contributions of Belarusian people. For this reason, 
according to Maldis, Belarusian intellectuals must restitute the “lost events” into the 
history of this civilization, i.e. to increase the historical memory of Belarusians. This is 
the civilization mission of any national elite. As soon as this mission is fulfilled, there 
will be no more space for national complexes: Belarusians would become aware of 
their civilization.
The fulfillment of this task will probably demand some new historical books to be 
written, new movies to be made, as well as new songs, poems, paintings, etc. The goal 
is to revive and brighten up the historical knowledge among the masses: the higher the 
level of public interest the quicker the people would connect their history with their 
present-day life. The historical memory helps Belarusians to keep their past alive, in-
volve the past into the present life, and learn some historical lessons from rethinking 
it. Belarusians have to be proud of their history as well as they are proud of their sport 
results at the Olympic Games or their contemporary pop stars (popular singers, show-
men). The dominant mass culture keeps these figures on the top of mass interests, so 
that is why the scholars cannot ignore the mass culture as well as historical memory.
Some intellectuals would probably disagree with this project. However, Maldis has 
well argued his ideas providing them with popularity. Belarusians have indeed all the 
features of the borderland civilization. They only need to recognize it. 
It is a cultural and historical paradox, perhaps, that some EU scholars have already 
recognized the existence of Belarusian civilization as an integral part of the Slavic 
and European world; these scholars also explained the dual character of this civiliza-
tion (Ганчев 2007; Pawluczuk 2008). Unfortunately, some Belarusian intellectuals that 
often pretend to represent the nation on the EU level still argue against. Thus, accord-
ing to Pawluczuk (2008: 50), the current major idea of Belarus should be “to unite 
the elements of two civilizations”, Western and Russian, within a single borderland 
geopolitical space. In the view of the Bulgarian Ambassador to Belarus, a historian and 
philosopher Petko Ganchev, Belarus represents a synthesis of Western-European and 
Eastern-European values and principles in political, cultural, economic and social life 
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that makes this country “the most European among former soviet republics” (Ганчев 
2007: 15).
As for Belarusian scholars, Maldis is the major propagandist of the idea of Belarusian 
civilization among them. He described the features of Belarusian civilization that make 
it twofold: popular local identity (the so-called tuteyshye) versus developed civic or eth-
nic identity; bilingualism and polylingualism of the population versus single language; 
tolerance and religious pluralism versus religious fanaticism. According to Maldis, three 
borderland nations (Lithuanian, Polish and Belarusian) are close to each other because 
they belong to the same cultural space and have common history. He refers to the con-
cept of borderlandness: a cultural space where people prefer to identify themselves as 
“local” rather than define themselves by ethnic belonging. Maldis also refers to the fact 
that people of borderland civilizations speak several local languages: they must know all 
of them to successfully communicate under different circumstances (in trade, in urban 
everyday life, in the country, etc.). These borderland civilizations are open to neighbours; 
their nations desire to live in peace and successfully communicate with each other. It is 
worth mentioning here some other authors that confirm the dominance of “local” iden-
tity (as typical for the borderland population) and “local” language that might be a mix-
ture of several national languages being in use in the region. For example, Polish scholar 
Joanna Getka in her research of Russian-Belarusian borderland confirmed the existence 
of the “local language” that was usually identified as “ours”, “prosty” and “tuteyshy” 
(Гэтка 2004:10). This situation is similar to Polish-Lithuanian-Belarusian borderland (in 
particular, to Grodno region) as described by Maldis (Мальдзіс 2003: 3).
The case of Belarus as a contemporary part of the Eastern European borderland 
civilization, on the one hand, and a smaller borderland sub-civilization within the cur-
rent Belarusian nation constructed on the criteria of shared common values rather than 
ethno-national features, on the other, can be viewed as an example of the current social-
cultural complexity and global-national entanglement (Therborn 2001: 476). 
Conclusions
In our analysis we have been trying to show that borderland civilizations really exist. 
That is why social sciences need this concept to be well elaborated and used for research 
goals. Unlike the “classical” (“pure”) types of civilizations, borderland civilizations may 
contain contradictory features that coincide with each other quite peacefully. In the con-
temporary global world the number of borderland civilizations is growing: for example, 
the current U.S. president Barack Obama represents an African-American borderland 
civilization within a bigger American civilization where white men dominate. A black 
president with some Muslim roots as a political leader of the U.S., – a super-power of 
the globe and a leader of western civilization, – what can be more exciting? This fact 
clearly proves that socio-cultural groups living on the edge of big cultures construct 
their own world outlook, own culture and own civilizations.
Belarus is a part of the Eastern European borderland civilization that combines fea-
tures of East and West, being close to both of them. At the same time Belarus can be 
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considered as a sub-civilization with its own cultural code. For many historical and po-
litical reasons, this Belarusian sub-civilization has not been well developed. Therefore, 
potentially, Belarus is a unique borderland sub-civilization with all necessary attributes. 
However, in order to affirm its right to exist as a reality, the idea of Belarusian sub-
civilization has to become a part of the national idea, Belarusian historical memory and 
national consciousness. It is a task of the national elites to help the population recognize 
their history and their cultural heritage as a part of Eastern-European borderland civili-
zation and at the same time as a smaller Belarusian sub-civilization with a unique cul-
tural code. Perhaps, that will support the process of a new reconstruction of Belarusian 
nation in order to find its place in the globalized world.
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BALTARUSIJA – PARIBIO CIVILIZACIJA AR 




Civilizacijų samprata atlieka svarbų vaidmenį dabartinėje mokslinėje literatūro-
je. Vieni autoriai teigia esant tam tikrą civilizacijų skaičių. Kitiems autoriams 
lieka atviras klausimas – kiek yra civilizacijų. Atsakymas priklauso nuo taikomo 
kriterijaus. Straipsnyje apmąstoma paribio civilizacijos samprata, kuri yra susi-
jusi tiek su šalimis (erdve), tiek su žmonėmis (kultūrinėmis bendruomenėmis, 
gyvenančiomis toje erdvėje), įsikūrusiais tarp dviejų pagrindinių kultūrinių 
grupių (remiantis Samuelio Huntingtono požiūriu), kurios neišvengiamai derina 
abiejų bruožus. Straipsnio autorė įrodinėja, kad, pirma, nūdienė lenkų, lietu-
vių ir baltarusių paribio populiacija kuria ypatingą paribio civilizaciją, kurios 
sąlygomis vietinis tapatumas („mes čionykščiai“) dominuoja tautinio arba etni-
nio tapatumų atžvilgiu. Nors čia gali koegzistuoti ir kiti tapatumai, tačiau ši 
paribio populiacija iš esmės save suvokia kaip „vietinę“, kurioje šimtmečiais 
egzistavo daugiaetninės, daugiakultūrės ir daugiareligės bendruomenės. Antra, 
pasak autorės, dabartinė Baltarusija gali būti vertinama kaip pari bio subcivi-
lizacijos atvejis. Jos istorijai daug įtakos turėjo lotyniškoji (Vakarų) ir bizan-
tiškoji (Rytų) civilizacijos, o tai lėmė baltarusių kultūrinį pliuralizmą, didelę 
religinę ir etninę toleranciją bei vietinės populiacijos tapatumo formavimąsi. 
Todėl Baltarusija neturi alternatyvos priklausyti vienai „grynai“ civilizacijai – 
jai lemta egzistuoti paribyje. Iš šio požiūrio išplaukia, kad dabartinė Baltarusija 
nėra „civilizacijos pakraščiai“. Ji yra subcivilizacija su visomis jai būdingomis 
savybėmis, tokiomis kaip kultūra, vertybės, istorijos idėjos, ir viršnacionaline 
sociokultūrine žmonių bendruomene. 
reikšminiai žodžiai: Baltarusija, paribio civilizacija, civilizacijos pakraščiai, 
tautinis tapatumas. 
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